Innovation is not a new phenomenon. Arguably, it is as old as mankind itself. There seems to be something inherently ''human'' about the tendency to think about new and better ways of doing things and to try them out in practice. Without it, the world in which we live would look very, very diVerent. Try for a moment to think of a world without airplanes, automobiles, telecommunications, and refrigerators, just to mention a few of the more important innovations from the not-too-distant past. Or-from an even longer perspective-where would we be without such fundamental innovations as agriculture, the wheel, the alphabet, or printing? In spite of its obvious importance, innovation has not always received the scholarly attention it deserves. For instance, students of long-run economic change used to focus on factors such as capital accumulation or the working of markets, rather than on innovation. This is now changing. Research on the role of innovation in economic and social change has proliferated in recent years, particularly within the social sciences, and with a bent towards cross-disciplinarity. In fact, as illustrated in Figure 1 .1, in recent years the number of social-science publications focusing on innovation has increased much faster than the total number of such publications.
As a result, our knowledge about innovation processes, their determinants and social and economic impact has been greatly enhanced.
When innovation studies started to emerge as a separate Weld of research in the 1960s, it did so mostly outside the existing disciplines and the most prestigious universities. An important event in this process was the formation in 1965 of the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) at the University of Sussex (see Box 1.1). The name of the center illustrates the tendency for innovation studies to develop unde other (at the time more acceptable?) terms, such as, for instance, ''science studies'' or ''science policy studies.'' But as we shall see in the following, one of the main lessons from the research that came to be carried out is that science is only one among several ingredients in successful innovation. As a consequence of these Wndings, not only the focus of research in this area but also the notions used to characterize it changed. During the late twentieth/early twenty-Wrst century, a number of new research centers and departments have been founded, focusing on the role of innovation in 0 5 10 15 20 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Year Fig. 1 .1 Scholarly Articles with ''Innovation'' in the title, 1955-2004 (per 10,000 social science articles)
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When innovation studies started to emerge as a separate Weld of research in the 1960s, it did so mostly outside the existing disciplines and the most prestigious universities. An important event in this process was the formation in 1965 of the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) at the University of Sussex (see Box 1.1). The name of the center illustrates the tendency for innovation studies to develop under other (at the time more acceptable?) terms, such as, for instance, ''science studies'' or ''science policy studies.'' But as we shall see in the following, one of the main lessons from the research that came to be carried out is that science is only one among several ingredients in successful innovation. As a consequence of these findings, not only the focus of research in this area but also the notions used to characterize it changed. During the late twentieth/early twenty-first century, a number of new research centers and departments have been founded, focusing on the role of innovation in economic and social change. Many of these have a crossdisciplinary orientation, illustrating the need for innovation to be studied from different perspectives. Several journals and professional associations have also been founded.
When innovation studies started to emerge as a separate field of research in the and networks), the working of which is studied within disciplines such as sociology, organizational science, management, and business studies. Moreover, as economic geographers point out, learning processes tend to be linked to speciWc contexts or locations. The way innovation is organized and its localization also undergo important changes through time, as underscored by the work within the Weld of economic history. There is also, as historians of technology have pointed out, a speciWc technological dimension to this; the way innovation is organized, as well as its economic and social eVects, depends critically on the speciWc nature of the technology in question.
Two decades ago, it was still possible for a hard-working student to get a fairly good overview of the scholarly work on innovation by devoting a few years of intensive study to the subject. Not any more. Today, the literature on innovation is so large and diverse that even keeping up-to-date with one speciWc Weld of research is very challenging. The purpose of this volume is to provide the reader with a guide to this rapidly expanding literature. We do this under the following broad headings:
I Innovation in the Making II The Systemic Nature of Innovation III How Innovation DiVers IV Innovation and Performance.
Part One focuses on the process through which innovations occur and the actors that take part: individuals, Wrms, organizations, and networks. As we will discuss in more detail below, innovation is by its very nature a systemic phenomenon, since it results from continuing interaction between diVerent actors and organizations. Part Two outlines the systems perspective on innovation studies and discusses the roles of institutions, organizations, and actors in this process at the national and regional level. Part Three explores the diversity in the manner in which such systems work over time and across diVerent sectors or industries. Finally, Part Four examines the broader social and economic consequences of innovation and the associated policy issues. The remainder of this chapter sets the stage for the discussion that follows by giving a broad overview of some of the central topics in innovation studies (including conceptual issues). An important distinction is normally made between invention and innovation.2 Invention is the Wrst occurrence of an idea for a new product or process, while innovation is the Wrst attempt to carry it out into practice. Sometimes, invention and innovation are closely linked, to the extent that it is hard to distinguish one from another (biotechnology for instance). In many cases, however, there is a considerable time lag between the two. In fact, a lag of several decades or more is not uncommon (Rogers 1995) . Such lags reXect the diVerent requirements for working out ideas and implementing them. While inventions may be carried out anywhere, for example in universities, innovations occur mostly in Wrms, though they may also occur in other types of organizations, such as public hospitals. To be able to turn an invention into an innovation, a Wrm normally needs to combine several diVerent types of knowledge, capabilities, skills, and resources. For instance, the Wrm may require production knowledge, skills and facilities, market knowledge, a wellfunctioning distribution system, suVicient Wnancial resources, and so on. It follows that the role of the innovator,3 i.e. the person or organizational unit responsible for combining the factors necessary (what the innovation theorist Joseph Schumpeter (see Box 1.2) called the ''entrepreneur''), may be quite diVerent from that of the inventor. Indeed, history is replete with cases in which the inventor of major technological advances fails to reap the proWts from his breakthroughs.
Long lags between invention and innovation may have to do with the fact that, in many cases, some or all of the conditions for commercialization may be lacking. There may not be a suVicient need (yet!) or it may be impossible to produce and/or market because some vital inputs or complementary factors are not (yet!) available. Thus, although Leonardo da Vinci is reported to have had some quite advanced ideas for a Xying machine, these were impossible to carry out in practice due to a lack of adequate materials, production skills, and-above all-a power source. In fact, the realization of these ideas had to wait for the invention and subsequent commercialization (and improvement) of the internal combustion engine.4 Hence, as this example shows, many inventions require complementary inventions and innovations to succeed at the innovation stage.
Another complicating factor is that invention and innovation is a continuous process. For instance, the car, as we know it today, is radically improved compared to the Wrst commercial models, due to the incorporation of a very large number of diVerent inventions/innovations. In fact, the Wrst versions of virtually all signiWcant innovations, from the steam engine to the airplane, were crude, unreliable versions of the devices that eventually diVused widely. Kline and Rosenberg (1986) , in an inXuential paper, point out:
it is a serious mistake to treat an innovation as if it were a well-deWned, homogenous thing that could be identiWed as entering the economy at a precise date-or becoming available at a precise point in time. . . . The fact is that most important innovations go through drastic changes in their lifetimes-changes that may, and often do, totally transform their economic signiWcance. The subsequent improvements in an invention after its Wrst introduction may be vastly more important, economically, than the initial availability of the invention in its original form. (Kline and Rosenberg 1986: 283) Thus, what we think of as a single innovation is often the result of a lengthy process involving many interrelated innovations. This is one of the reasons why innovation: a guide to the literaturemany students of technology and innovation Wnd it natural to apply a systems perspective rather than to focus exclusively on individual inventions/innovations.
Innovations may also be classiWed according to ''type.'' Schumpeter (see Box 1.2) distinguished between Wve diVerent types: new products, new methods of production, new sources of supply, the exploitation of new markets, and new ways to Very early he developed an original approach, focusing on the role of innovation in economic and social change. It was not suVicient, Schumpeter argued, to study the economy through static lenses, focusing on the distribution of given resources across diVerent ends. Economic development, in his view, had to be seen as a process of qualitative change, driven by innovation, taking place in historical time. As examples of innovation he mentioned new products, new methods of production, new sources of supply, the exploitation of new markets, and new ways to organize business. He deWned innovation as ''new combinations'' of existing resources. This combinatory activity he labeled ''the entrepreneurial function'' (to be fulWlled by ''entrepreneurs''), to which he attached much importance. One main reason for the important role played by entrepreneurs for successful innovation was the prevalence of inertia, or ''resistance to new ways'' as he phrased it, at all levels of society that entrepreneurs had to Wght in order to succeed in their aims. In his early work, which is sometimes called ''Schumpeter Mark I,'' Schumpeter focused mostly on individual entrepreneurs. But in later works he also emphasized the importance of innovation in large Wrms (so-called ' 'Schumpeter Mark II'') , and pointed to historically oriented, qualitative research (case studies) as the way forward for research in this area.
In his analysis of innovation diVusion, Schumpeter emphasized the tendency for innovations to ''cluster'' in certain industries and time periods (and the derived eVects on growth) and the possible contribution of such ''clustering'' to the formation of business cycles and ''long waves'' in the world economy (Schumpeter 1939) . The latter suggestion has been a constant source of controversy ever since. No less controversial, and perhaps even better known, is his inspired discussion of the institutional changes under capitalism (and its possible endogenous transformation into ''socialism'') in the book Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1943) .
Sources : Swedberg 1991; Shionoya 1997; Fagerberg 2003. organize business. However, in economics, most of the focus has been on the two Wrst of these. Schmookler (1966) , for instance, in his classic work on ''Invention and Economic Growth,'' argued that the distinction between ''product technology'' and ''production technology'' was ''critical'' for our understanding of this phenomenon (ibid. 166). He deWned the former type as knowledge about how to create or improve products, and the latter as knowledge about how to produce them. Similarly, the terms ''product innovation'' and ''process innovation'' have been used to characterize the occurrence of new or improved goods and services, and improvements in the ways to produce these good and services, respectively.5 The argument for focusing particularly on the distinction between product and process innovation often rests on the assumption that their economic and social impact may diVer. For instance, while the introduction of new products is commonly assumed to have a clear, positive eVect on growth of income and employment, it has been argued that process innovation, due to its cost-cutting nature, may have a more ambiguous eVect (Edquist et al. 2001 ; Pianta in this volume). However, while clearly distinguishable at the level of the individual Wrm or industry, such diVerences tend to become blurred at the level of the overall economy, because the product of one Wrm (or industry) may end up as being used to produce goods or services in another. 6 The focus on product and process innovations, while useful for the analysis of some issues, should not lead us ignore other important aspects of innovation. For instance, during the Wrst half of the twentieth century, many of the innovations that made it possible for the United States to ''forge ahead'' of other capitalist economies were of the organizational kind, involving entirely new ways to organize production and distribution (see Bruland and Mowery in this volume, while Lam provides an overview of organizational innovation). Edquist et al. (2001) have suggested dividing the category of process innovation into ''technological process innovations'' and ''organizational process innovations,'' the former related to new types of machinery, and the latter to new ways to organize work. However, organizational innovations are not limited to new ways to organize the process of production within a given Wrm. Organizational innovation, in the sense used by Schumpeter,7 also includes arrangements across Wrms such as the reorganization of entire industries. Moreover, as exempliWed by the case of the USA in the Wrst half of the previous century, many of the most important organizational innovations have occurred in distribution, with great consequences for a whole range of industries (Chandler 1990) .
Another approach, also based on Schumpeter's work, has been to classify innovations according to how radical they are compared to current technology (Freeman and Soete 1997) . From this perspective, continuous improvements of the type referred to above are often characterized as ''incremental'' or ''marginal'' innovations,8 as opposed to ''radical'' innovations (such as the introduction of a totally new type of machinery) or ''technological revolutions'' (consisting of a cluster of innovations that together may have a very far-reaching impact). Schumpeter focused in particular on the latter two categories, which he believed to be of greater innovation: a guide to the literatureimportance. It is a widely held view, however, that the cumulative impact of incremental innovations is just as great (if not greater), and that to ignore these leads to a biased view of long run economic and social change (Lundvall et al. 1992) . Moreover, the realization of the economic beneWts from ''radical'' innovations in most cases (including those of the airplane and the automobile, discussed earlier) requires a series of incremental improvements. Arguably, the bulk of economic beneWts come from incremental innovations and improvements.
There is also the question of how to take diVerent contexts into account. If A for the Wrst time introduces a particular innovation in one context, while B later introduces the same innovation in another, would we characterize both as innovators? This is a matter of convention. A widely used practice, based on Schumpeter's work, is to reserve the term innovator for A and characterize B as an imitator. But one might argue that, following Schumpeter's own deWnition, it would be equally consistent to call B an innovator as well, since B is introducing the innovation for the Wrst time in a new context. This is, for instance, the position taken by Hobday (2000) in a discussion of innovation in the so-called ''newly industrializing countries'' in Asia.9 One might object, though, that there is a qualitative diVerence between (a) commercializing something for the Wrst time and (b) copying it and introducing it in a diVerent context. The latter arguably includes a larger dose of imitative behavior (imitation), or what is sometimes called ''technology transfer.'' This does not exclude the possibility that imitation may lead to new innovation(s). In fact, as pointed out by Kline and Rosenberg (1986 , see Box 1.3), many economically signiWcant innovations occur while a product or process is diVusing (see also Hall in this volume). Introducing something in a new context often implies considerable adaptation (and, hence, incremental innovation) and, as history has shown, organizational changes (or innovations) that may signiWcantly increase productivity and competitiveness (see Godinho and Fagerberg in this volume).10
Box 1.3 What innovation is not: the linear model
Sometimes it easier to characterize a complex phenomenon by clearly pointing out what it is NOT. Stephen Kline and Nathan Rosenberg did exactly this when they, in an inXuential paper from 1986, used the concept ''the linear model'' to characterize a widespread but in their view erroneous interpretation of innovation.
Basically, ''the linear model'' is based on the assumption that innovation is applied science. It is ''linear'' because there is a well-deWned set of stages that innovations are assumed to go through. Research (science) comes Wrst, then development, and Wnally production and marketing. Since research comes Wrst, it is easy to think of this as the critical element. Hence, this perspective, which is often associated with Vannevar Bush's programmatic statements on the organization of the US research systems (Bush 1945) , is well suited to defend the interests of researchers and scientists and the organizations in which they work. Leaving deWnitions aside, the fundamental question for innovation research is of course to explain how innovations occur. One of the reasons innovation was ignored in mainstream social science for so long was that this was seen as impossible to do. The best one could do, it was commonly assumed, was to look at innovation as a random phenomenon (or ''manna from heaven,'' as some scholars used to phrase it). Schumpeter, in his early works, was one of the Wrst to object to this practice. His own account of these processes emphasized three main aspects. The Wrst was the fundamental uncertainty inherent in all innovation projects; the second was the need to move quickly before somebody else did (and reap the potential economic reward). In practice, Schumpeter argued, these two aspects meant that the standard behavioral rules, e.g., surveying all information, assessing it, and Wnding the ''optimal'' choice, would not work. Other, quicker ways had to be found. This in his view involved leadership and vision, two qualities he associated with entrepreneurship. The third aspect of the innovation process was the prevalence of ''resistance to new ways''-or inertia-at all levels of society, which threatened to destroy all novel initiatives, and forced entrepreneurs to Wght hard to succeed in their projects. Or as he put it: ''In the breast of one who wishes to do something new, the forces of habit raise up and bear witness against the embryonic project'' (Schumpeter 1934: 86) . Such inertia, in Schumpeter's view, was to some extent endogenous, since it reXected the embedded character of existing knowledge and habit, which, though ''energysaving,'' tended to bias decision-making against new ways of doing things.
Hence, in Schumpeter's early work (sometimes called ''Schumpeter Mark I'') innovation is the outcome of continuous struggle in historical time between individual entrepreneurs, advocating novel solutions to particular problems, and social
The problems with this model, Kline and Rosenberg point out, are twofold. First, it generalizes a chain of causation that only holds for a minority of innovations. Although some important innovations stem from scientiWc breakthroughs, this is not true most of the time. Firms normally innovate because they believe there is a commercial need for it, and they commonly start by reviewing and combining existing knowledge. It is only if this does not work, they argue, that Wrms consider investing in research (science). In fact, in many settings, the experience of users, not science, is deemed to be the most important source of innovation (von Hippel 1988; Lundvall 1988) . Second, ''the linear model'' ignores the many feedbacks and loops that occur between the diVerent ''stages'' of the process. Shortcomings and failures that occur at various stages may lead to a reconsideration of earlier steps, and this may eventually lead to totally new innovations.
innovation: a guide to the literatureinertia, with the latter seen as (partly) endogenous. This may, to some extent, have been an adequate interpretation of events in Europe around the turn of the nineteenth century. But during the Wrst decades of the twentieth century, it became clear to observers that innovations increasingly involve teamwork and take place within larger organizations (see Bruland and Mowery (Ch. 13), Lam (Ch. 5), and Lazonick (Ch. 2) in this volume). In later work, Schumpeter acknowledged this and emphasized the need for systematic study of ''cooperative'' entrepreneurship in big Wrms (so-called ''Schumpeter Mark II''). However, he did not analyze the phenomenon in much detail (although he strongly advised others to).11
Systematic theoretical and empirical work on innovation-projects in Wrms (and the management of such projects) was slow to evolve, but during the last decades a quite substantial literature has emerged (see chapters by Pavitt and Lam in this volume) . In general, research in this area coincides with Schumpeter's emphasis on uncertainty (Nelson and Winter 1982; Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995; Van de Ven et al. 1999) . In particular, for potentially rewarding innovations, it is argued, one may simply not know what are the most relevant sources or the best options to pursue (still less how great the chance is of success).12 It has also been emphasized that innovative Wrms need to consider the potential problems that ''path dependency'' may create (Arthur 1994) . For instance, if a Wrm selects a speciWc innovation path very early, it may (if it is lucky) enjoy ''Wrst mover'' advantages. But it also risks being ''locked in'' to this speciWc path through various self-reinforcing eVects. If in the end it turns out that there actually existed a superior path, which some other Wrm equipped with more patience (or luck) happened to Wnd, the early mover may be in big trouble because then, it is argued, it may simply be too costly or too late to switch paths. It has been suggested, therefore, that in the early phase of an innovation project, before suVicient knowledge of the alternatives is generated, the best strategy may simply be to avoid being ''stuck'' to a particular path, and remain open to diVerent (and competing) ideas/solutions. At the level of the Wrm, this requires a ''pluralistic leadership'' that allows for a variety of competing perspectives (Van de Ven et al. 1999) , in contrast to the homogenous, unitary leader style that, in the management literature, is sometimes considered as the most advantageous. 13 ''Openness'' to new ideas and solutions? is considered essential for innovation projects, especially in the early phases. The principal reason for this has to do with a fundamental characteristic of innovation: that every new innovation consists of a new combination of existing ideas, capabilities, skills, resources, etc. It follows logically from this that the greater the variety of these factors within a given system, the greater the scope for them to be combined in diVerent ways, producing new innovations which will be both more complex and more sophisticated. This evolutionary logic has been used to explain why, in ancient times, the inhabitants of the large Eurasian landmass came to be more innovative, and technologically sophisticated, than small, isolated populations elsewhere around the globe (Diamond 1998) . Applied mechanically on a population of Wrms, this logic might perhaps be taken to imply that large Wrms should be expected to be more innovative than small Wrms.14 However, modern Wrms are not closed systems comparable to isolated populations of ancient times. Firms have learnt, by necessity, to monitor closely each other's steps, and search widely for new ideas, inputs, and sources of inspiration. The more Wrms on average are able to learn from interacting with external sources, the greater the pressure on others to follow suit. This greatly enhances the innovativeness of both individual Wrms and the economic systems to which they belong (regions or countries, for instance). Arguably, this is of particular importance for smaller Wrms, which have to compensate for small internal resources by being good at interacting with the outside world. However, the growing complexity of the knowledge bases necessary for innovation means that even large Wrms increasingly depend on external sources in their innovative activity (Granstrand, Patel, and Pavitt, 1997 ; and in this volume: Pavitt; Powell and Grodal; Narula and Zanfei).
Hence, cultivating the capacity for absorbing (outside) knowledge, so-called ''absorptive capacity'' (Cohen and Levinthal 1990) , is a must for innovative Wrms, large or small. It is, however, something that Wrms often Wnd very challenging; the ''not invented here'' syndrome is a well-known feature in Wrms of all sizes. This arguably reXects the cumulative and embedded character of Wrm-speciWc knowledge. In most cases, Wrms develop their knowledge of how to do things incrementally. Such knowledge, then, consists of ''routines'' that are reproduced through practice (''organizational memory'': Nelson and Winter 1982) . Over time, the organizational structure of the Wrm and its knowledge base typically co-evolve into a set-up that is beneWcial for the day-to-day operations of the Wrm. It has been argued, however, that such a set-up, while facilitating the daily internal communication/ interaction of the Wrm, may in fact constrain the Wrm's capacity for absorbing new knowledge created elsewhere, especially if the new external knowledge signiWcantly challenges the existing set-up/knowledge of the Wrm (so-called ''competence destroying technical change'': Tushman and Anderson 1986). In fact, such problems may occur even for innovations that are created internally. Xerox, for instance, developed both the PC and the mouse, but failed to exploit commercially these innovations, primarily because they did not seem to be of much value to the Wrm's existing photo-copier business (Rogers 1995) .
Thus organizing for innovation is a delicate task. Research in this area has, among other things, pointed to the need for innovative Wrms to allow groups of people within the organization suVicient freedom in experimenting with new solutions (Van de Ven 1999) , and establishing patterns of interaction within the Wrm that allow it to mobilize its entire knowledge base when confronting new challenges (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995; Lam, Ch. 5 in this volume) . Such organizing does not stop at the gate of the Wrm, but extends to relations with external partners. Ties to partners with whom communication is frequent are often called ''strong ties,'' while those that are more occasional are denoted as ''weak ties'' (Granovetter 1973; see Powell and Grodal, Ch. 3 in this volume) . Partners linked together with strong ties, either innovation: a guide to the literaturedirectly, or indirectly via a common partner, may self-organize into (relatively stable) networks. Such networks may be very useful for managing and maintaining openness. But just as Wrms can display symptoms of path-dependency, the same can happen to established networks, as the participants converge to a common perception of reality (so-called ''group-think''). Innovative Wrms therefore often Wnd it useful to also cultivate so-called ''weak ties'' in order to maintain a capacity for changing its orientation (should it prove necessary). As is evident from the preceding discussion, a central Wnding in the literature is that, in most cases, innovation activities in Wrms depend heavily on external sources. One recent study sums it up well: ''Popular folklore notwithstanding, the innovation journey is a collective achievement that requires key roles from numerous entrepreneurs in both the public and private sectors'' ( Van de Ven et al. 1999: 149) . In that particular study, the term ''social system for innovation development'' was used to characterize this ''collective achievement.'' However, this is just one among several examples from the last decades of how system concepts are applied to the analysis of the relationship between innovation activities in Wrms and the wider framework in which these activities are embedded (see Edquist, Ch. 7 in this volume).
The Systemic
One main approach has been to delineate systems on the basis of technological, industrial, or sectoral characteristics (Freeman et al. 1982; Hughes 1983; Carlsson and Stankiewicz 1991; Malerba, Ch. 14 in this volume) but, to a varying degree, to include other relevant factors such as, for instance, institutions (laws, regulations, rules, habits, etc.), the political process, the public research infrastructure (universities, research institutes, support from public sources, etc.), Wnancial institutions, skills (labor force), and so on. To explore the technological dynamics of innovation, its various phases, and how this inXuences and is inXuenced by the wider social, institutional, and economic frameworks has been the main focus of this type of analysis. Another important approach in the innovation-systems literature has focused on the spatial level, and used national or regional borders to distinguish between diVerent systems. For example, Lundvall (1992) and Nelson et al. (1993) have used the term ''national system of innovation'' to characterize the systemic interdependencies within a given country (see Edquist in this volume), while Braczyk et al. (1997) similarly have oVered the notion of ''regional innovation systems'' (see Asheim and Gertler, Ch. 11 in this volume). Since the spatial systems are delineated on the basis of political and administrative borders, such factors naturally tend to play an important role in analyses based on this approach, which has proven to be inXuential among policy makers in this area, especially in Europe (see Lundvall and Borrás, Ch. 22 in this volume). (Part II of this volume analyzes some of the constituent elements of such systems in more detail. 15) What are the implications of applying a system perspective to the study of innovation? Systems are-as networks-a set of activities (or actors) that are interlinked, and this leads naturally to a focus on the working of the linkages of the system.16 Is the potential for communication and interaction through existing linkages suViciently exploited? Are there potential linkages within the system that might proWtably be established? Such questions apply of course to networks as well as systems. However, in the normal usage of the term, a system will typically have more ''structure'' than a network, and be of a more enduring character. The structure of a system will facilitate certain patterns of interaction and outcomes (and constrain others), and in this sense there is a parallel to the role of ''inertia'' in Wrms. A dynamic system also has feedbacks, which may serve to reinforce-or weaken-the existing structure/functioning of the system, leading to ''lock in ''(a stable conWguration), or a change in orientation, or-eventually-the dissolution of the system. Hence, systems may-just as Wrms-be locked into a speciWc path of development that supports certain types of activities and constrains others. This may be seen as an advantage, as it pushes the participating Wrms and other actors in the system in a direction that is deemed to be beneWcial. But it may also be a disadvantage, if the conWguration of the system leads Wrms to ignore potentially fruitful avenues of exploration. The character of such processes will be aVected by the extent to which the system exchanges impulses with its environment. The more open a system is for impulses from outside, the less the chance of being ''locked out'' from promising new paths of development that emerge outside the system. It is, therefore, important for ''system managers''-such as policy makers-to keep an eye on the openness of the system, to avoid the possibility of innovation activities becoming unduly constrained by self-reinforcing path-dependency.
Another important feature of systems that has come into focus is the strong complementarities that commonly exist between the components of a system. If, in a dynamic system, one critical, complementary component is lacking, or fails to progress or develop, this may block or slow down the growth of the entire system. This is, as pointed out earlier, one of the main reasons why there is often a very considerable time lag between invention and innovation. Economic historians have commonly used concepts such as ''reverse salients'' and ''bottlenecks'' to characterize such phenomena (Hughes 1983; Rosenberg 1982) . However, such constraints need not be of a purely technical character (such as, for instance, the failure to invent a decent battery, which has severely constrained the diVusion of electric cars for more than century), but may have to do with lack of proper infrastructure, Wnance, skills, etc. Some of the most important innovations of this century, such as electricity and automobiles (Mowery and Rosenberg 1998) , were dependent on very extensive innovation: a guide to the literatureinfrastructural investments (wiring and roads/distribution-systems for fuel, respectively). Moreover, to fulWl the potential of the new innovation, such investments often need to be accompanied by radical changes in the organization of production and distribution (and, more generally, attitudes: see Perez 1983 Perez , 1985 Freeman and Louçâ 2001) . There are important lessons here for Wrms and policy makers. Firms may need to take into account the wider social and economic implications of an innovation project. The more radical an innovation is, the greater the possibility that it may require extensive infrastructural investments and/or organizational and social change to succeed. If so, the Wrm needs to think through the way in which it may join up with other agents of change in the private or public sector. Policy makers, for their part, need to consider what diVerent levels of government can do to prevent ''bottlenecks'' to occur at the system level in areas such as skills, the research infrastructure, and the broader economic infrastructure. One of the striking facts about innovation is its variability over time and space. It seems, as Schumpeter (see Box 1.2) pointed out, to ''cluster,'' not only in certain sectors but also in certain areas and time periods. Over time the centers of innovation have shifted from one sector, region, and country to another. For instance, for a long period the worldwide center of innovation was in the UK, and the productivity and income of its population increased relative to its neighboring countries, so that by the mid-nineteenth century its productivity (and income) level was 50 per cent higher than elsewhere; at about the beginning of the twentieth century the center of innovation, at least for the modern chemical and electrical technologies of the day, shifted to Germany; and now, for a long time, the worldwide center of innovation has been in the USA, which during most of the twentieth century enjoyed the highest productivity and living standards in the world. As explained by Bruland and Mowery in this volume, the rise of the US to world technological leadership was associated with the growth of new industries, based on the exploitation of economies of scale and scope (Chandler 1962 (Chandler , 1990 ) and mass production and distribution.
How is this dynamic to be explained? Schumpeter, extending an earlier line of argument dating back to Karl Marx,17 held technological competition (competition through innovation) to be the driving force of economic development. If one Wrm in a given industry or sector successfully introduces an important innovation, the argument goes, it will be amply rewarded by a higher rate of proWt. This functions as a signal to other Wrms (the imitators), which, if entry conditions allow, will ''swarm'' the industry or sector with the hope of sharing the beneWts (with the result that the initial innovator's Wrst mover advantages may be quickly eroded). This ''swarming'' of imitators implies that the growth of the sector or industry in which the innovation occurs will be quite high for a while. Sooner or later, however, the eVects on growth (created by an innovation) will be depleted and growth will slow down.
To this essentially Marxian story Schumpeter added an important modiWcation. Imitators, he argued, are much more likely to succeed in their aims if they improve on the original innovation, i.e., become innovators themselves. This is all the more natural, he continued, because one (important) innovation tends to facilitate (induce) other innovations in the same or related Welds. In this way, innovationdiVusion becomes a creative process-in which one important innovation sets the stage for a whole series of subsequent innovations-and not the passive, adaptive process often assumed in much diVusion research (see Hall in this volume). The systemic interdependencies between the initial and induced innovations also imply that innovations (and growth) ''tend to concentrate in certain sectors and their surroundings'' or ''clusters'' (Schumpeter 1939: 100-1) . Schumpeter, as is well known, looked at this dynamic as a possible explanatory factor behind business cycles of various lengths (Freeman and Louçâ 2001) .
This simple scheme has been remarkably successful in inspiring applications in diVerent areas. For instance, there is a large amount of research that has adapted the Marx-Schumpeter model of technological competition to the study of industrial growth, international trade, and competitiveness,18 although sometimes, it must be said, without acknowledging the source for these ideas. An early and very inXuential contribution was the so-called ''product-life-cycle theory'' suggested by Vernon (1966) , in which industrial growth following an important product innovation was seen as composed of stages, characterized by changing conditions of and location of production.19 Basically what was assumed was that the ability to do product innovation mattered most at the early stage, in which there were many diVerent and competing versions of the product on the market. However, with time, the product was assumed to standardize, and this was assumed to be accompanied by a greater emphasis on process innovation, scale economics, and cost-competition. It was argued that these changes in competitive conditions might initiate transfer of the technology from the innovator country (high income) to countries with large markets and/or low costs. Such transfers might also be associated with international capital Xows in the form of so-called foreign direct investments (FDIs), and the theory has therefore also become known as a framework for explaining such Xows (see Narula and Zanfei in this volume).
The ''product-life-cycle theory,'' attractive as it was in its simplicity, was not always corroborated by subsequent research. While it got some of the general conjectures (borrowed from Schumpeter) right, the rigorous scheme it added, innovation: a guide to the literaturewith well-deWned stages, standardization, and changing competitive requirements, was shown to Wt only a minority of industries (Walker 1979; Cohen 1995) . Although good data are hard to come by, what emerges from empirical research is a much more complex picture,20 with considerable diVerences across industrial sectors in the way this dynamic is shaped. As exempliWed by the taxonomy suggested by Pavitt (see Box 1.4), exploration of such diVerences (''industrial dynamics'') has evolved into one of the main areas of research within innovation studies (see in this volume:
Box 1.4 What is high-tech? Pavitt's taxonomy
The degree of technological sophistication, or innovativeness, of an industry or sector is something that attracts a lot of interest, and there have been several attempts to develop ways of classifying industries or sectors according to such criteria. The most widely used in common parlance is probably the distinction between ''high-tech,'' ''medium-tech,'' and ''low-tech,'' although it is not always clear exactly what is meant by this. Often it is equated with high, medium, and low R&D intensity in production (or value added), either directly (in the industry itself) or including R&D embodied in machinery and other inputs. Based on this, industries such as aerospace, computers, semiconductors, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, and instruments are commonly classiWed as ''high-tech,'' while ''medium-tech'' typically include electrical and non-electrical machinery, transport equipment, and parts of the chemical industries. The remaining, ''low-tech,'' low R&D category, then, comprises industries such as textiles, clothing, leather products, furniture, paper products, food, and so on (Fagerberg 1997; see Smith in this volume for an extended discussion).
However, while organized R&D activity is an important source of innovation in contemporary capitalism, it is not the only one. A focus on R&D alone might lead one to ignore or overlook innovation activities based on other sources, such as skilled personnel (engineers, for instance), learning by doing, using, interacting, and so forth. This led Pavitt (1984) to develop a taxonomy or classiWcation scheme which took these other factors into account. Based a very extensive data-set on innovation in the UK (see Smith in this volume), he identiWed two (''high-tech'') sectors in the economy, both serving the rest of the economy with technology, but very diVerent in terms of how innovations were created. One, which he labeled ''science-based,'' was characterized by a lot of organized R&D and strong links to science, while another-so-called ''specialized suppliers'' (of machinery, instruments, and so on)-was based on capabilities in engineering, and frequent interaction with users. He also identiWed a scale-intensive sector (transport equipment, for instance), also relatively innovative, but with fewer repercussions for other sectors. Finally, he found a number of industries that, although not necessarily non-innovative in every respect, received most of their technology from other sectors.
An important result of Pavitt's analysis was the Wnding that the factors leading to successful innovation diVer greatly across industries/ sectors. This obviously called into question technology or innovation polices that only focused on one mechanism, such as, for instance, subsidies to R&D.
Ch. 14 by Malerba; Ch. 15 by VonTunzelmann and Acha; Ch. 16 by Miles). Inspired, to a large extent, by the seminal work by Nelson and Winter (see Box 1.5), research in this area has explored the manner in which industries and sectors diVer in terms of their internal dynamics (or ''technological regimes'': see Malerba and Orsenigo 1997) , focusing, in particular, on the diVerences across sectors in knowledge bases, actors, networks, and institutions (so called ''sectoral systems'': see Malerba, Ch. 14 in this volume). An important result from this research is that, since the factors that inXuence innovation diVer across industries, policy makers have to take such diVerences into account when designing policies. The same policy (and policy instruments) will not work equally well everywhere.
Box 1.5 Industrial dynamics-an evolutionary interpretation
The book An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (1982) by Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter is one of the most important contributions to the study of innovation and long run economic and social change. Nelson and Winter share the Schumpeterian focus on ''capitalism as an engine of change.'' However, building on earlier work by Herbert Simon and others (so-called ''procedural'' or ''bounded'' rationality), Nelson and Winter introduce a more elaborate theoretical perspective on how Wrms behave. In Nelson and Winter's models, Wrms' actions are guided by routines, which are reproduced through practice, as parts of the Wrms' ''organizational memory.'' Routines typically diVer across Wrms. For instance, some Wrms may be more inclined towards innovation, while others may prefer the less demanding (but also less rewarding) imitative route. If a routine leads to an unsatisfactory outcome, a Wrm may use its resources to search for a new one, which-if it satisWes the criteria set by the Wrm-will eventually be adopted (so-called ''satisWcing'' behavior).
Hence, instead of following the common practice in much economic theorizing of extrapolating the characteristics of a ''representative agent'' to an entire population (so-called ''typological thinking''), Nelson and Winter take into account the social and economic consequences of interaction within populations of heterogeneous actors (socalled ''population thinking''). They also emphasize the role of chance (the stochastic element) in determining the outcome of the interaction. In the book, these outcomes are explored through simulations, which allow the authors to study the consequences of varying the value of key parameters (to reXect diVerent assumptions on technological progress, Wrm behavior, etc.). They distinguish between an ''innovation regime,'' in which the technological frontier is assumed to progress independently of Wrms' own activities (the ''science based'' regime), and another in which technological progress is more endogenous and depends on what the Wrms themselves do (the ''cumulative'' regime). They also vary the ease/diViculty of innovation and imitation.
Nelson and Winter's work has been an important source of inspiration for subsequent work on ''knowledge-based Wrms,'' ''technological regimes,'' and ''industrial dynamics,'' and evolutionary economics more generally, to mention some important topics.
Sources: Nelson and Winter 1982; Andersen 1994; Fagerberg 2003. (Romer 1990) , drawing on new tools for mathematical modeling of economic phenomena, have attempted to introduce some of the above ideas into formal growth models (so-called ''new growth theory'' or ''endogenous growth theory'').21
In developing this perspective, Schumpeter (1939) was, as noted, particularly concerned with the tendency of innovations to ''cluster'' in certain contexts, and the resulting structural changes in production, organization, demand, etc. Although these ideas were not well received by the economic community at the time, the big slump in economic activity worldwide during the 1970s led to renewed attention, and several contributions emerged viewing long run economic and social change from this perspective. Both Mensch (1979) and Perez (1983 Perez ( , 1985 , to take just two examples, argued that major technological changes, such as, for instance, the ICT revolution today, or electricity a century ago, require extensive organizational and institutional change to run their course. Such change, however, is diVicult because of the continuing inXuence of existing organizational and institutional patterns. They saw this inertia as a major growth-impeding factor in periods of rapid technological change, possibly explaining some of the variation of growth over time (e.g. booms and slumps) in capitalist economies. While the latter proposition remains controversial, the relationship between technological, organizational, and institutional change continues to be an important research issue (Freeman and Louçã 2001) , with important implications both for the analysis of the diVusion of new technologies (see Hall in this volume) and the policy discourse (see Lundvall and Borras in this volume) .
Although neither Marx nor Schumpeter applied their dynamic perspective to the analysis of cross-national diVerences in growth performance, from the early 1960s onwards several contributions emerged that explore the potential of this perspective for explaining diVerences in cross-country growth. In what came to be a very inXuential contribution, Posner (1961) explained the diVerence in economic growth between two countries, at diVerent levels of economic and technological development, as resulting from two sources: innovation, which enhanced the diVerence, and imitation, which tended to reduce it. This set the stage for a long series of contributions, often labeled ''technology gap'' or ''north-south'' models (or approaches), focusing on explaining such diVerences in economic growth across countries at diVerent levels of development (see Fagerberg 1994 Fagerberg , 1996 for details). As for the lessons, one of the theoretical contributors in this area summed it up well when he concluded that: ''Like Alice and the Red Queen, the developed region has to keep running to stay in the same place'' (Krugman 1979: 262) .
A weakness of much of this work was that it was based on a very stylized representation of the global distribution of innovation, in which innovation was assumed to be concentrated in the developed world, mainly in the USA. In fact, as argued by Fagerberg and Godinho in this volume, the successful catch-up in technology and income is normally not based only on imitation, but also involves innovation to a signiWcant extent. Arguably, this is also what one should expect from the Schumpeterian perspective, in which innovation is assumed to be a pervasive phenomenon. Fagerberg (1987 Fagerberg ( , 1988 identiWed three factors aVecting diVerential growth rates across countries: innovation, imitation, and other eVorts related to the commercial exploitation of technology. The analysis suggested that superior innovative activity was the prime factor behind the huge diVerence in performance between Asian and Latin American NIC countries in the 1970s and early 1980s. Fagerberg and Verspagen (2002) likewise found that the continuing rapid growth of the Asian NICs relative to other country groupings in the decade that followed was primarily caused by the rapid growth in the innovative performance of this region. Moreover, it has been shown (Fagerberg 1987; Fagerberg and Verspagen 2002) that, while imitation has become more demanding over time (and hence more diVicult and/or costly to undertake), innovation has gradually become a more powerful factor in explaining diVerences across countries in economic growth. Arguably, we have a good understanding of the role played by innovation in long run economic and social change, and many of its consequences:
What do we
innovation: a guide to the literature. The function of innovation is to introduce novelty (variety) into the economic sphere. Should the stream of novelty (innovation) dry up, the economy will settle into a ''stationary state'' with little or no growth (Metcalfe 1998) . Hence, innovation is crucial for long-term economic growth. . Innovation tends to cluster in certain industries/sectors, which consequently grow more rapidly, implying structural changes in production and demand and, eventually, organizational and institutional change. The capacity to undertake the latter is important for the ability to create and to beneWt from innovation. . Innovation is a powerful explanatory factor behind diVerences in performance between Wrms, regions, and countries. Firms that succeed in innovation prosper, at the expense of their less able competitors. Innovative countries and regions have higher productivity and income than the less innovative ones. Countries or regions that wish to catch up with the innovation leaders face the challenge of increasing their own innovation activity (and ''absorptive capacity'') towards leader levels (see Godinho and Fagerberg in this volume).
Because of these desirable consequences, policy makers and business leaders alike are concerned with ways in which to foster innovation. Nevertheless, in spite of the large amount of research in this area during the past Wfty years, we know much less about why and how innovation occurs than what it leads to. Although it is by now well established that innovation is an organizational phenomenon, most theorizing about innovation has traditionally looked at it from an individualistic perspective, as exempliWed by Schumpeter's ''psychological'' theory of entrepreneurial behavior (Fagerberg 2003) . Similarly, most work on cognition and knowledge focuses on individuals, not organizations. An important exception was, of course, Nelson and Winter (1982) , whose focus on ''organizational memory'' and its links to practice paved the way for much subsequent work in this area.22 But our understanding of how knowledge-and innovation-operates at the organizational level remains fragmentary and further conceptual and applied research is needed.
A central Wnding in the innovation literature is that a Wrm does not innovate in isolation, but depends on extensive interaction with its environment. Various concepts have been introduced to enhance our understanding of this phenomenon, most of them including the terms ''system'' or (somewhat less ambitious) ''network.'' Some of these, such as the concept of a ''national system of innovation,'' have become popular among policy makers, who have been constrained in their ability to act by lack of a suViciently developed framework for the design and evaluation of policy. Still, it is a long way from pointing to the systemic character of innovation processes (at diVerent levels of analysis), to having an approach that is suViciently developed to allow for systematic analysis and assessment of policy issues. Arguably, to be really helpful in that regard, these system approaches are in need of substantial elaboration and reWnement (see the chapter by Edquist in this volume).
One obstacle to improving our understanding is that innovation has been studied by diVerent communities of researchers with diVerent backgrounds, and the failure of these communities to communicate more eVectively with one another has impeded progress in this Weld. One consequence of these communication diViculties has been a certain degree of ''fuzziness'' with respect to basic concepts, which can only be improved by bringing these diVerent communities together in a constructive dialogue, and the present volume should be seen as a contribution towards this aim. DiVerent, and to some extent competing, perspectives should not always be seen as a problem: many social phenomena are too complex to be analyzed properly from a single disciplinary perspective. Arguably, innovation is a prime example of this. Thanks also to Ovar Andreas Johansson for assistance in the research, Sandro Mendonça for his many creative inputs (which I unfortunately have not have been able to follow to the extent that he deserves), and Louise Earl for good advice. The responsibility for remaining errors and omissions is mine. 2. A consistent use of the terms invention and innovation might be to reserve these for the Wrst time occurrence of the idea/concept and commercialization, respectively. In practice it may not always be so simple. For instance, people may very well conceive the same idea independently of one another. Historically, there are many examples of this; writing, for instance, was clearly invented several times (and in diVerent cultural settings) throughout history (Diamond 1998) . Arguably, this phenomenon may have been reduced in importance over time, as communication around the globe has progressed. 3. In the sociological literature on diVusion (i.e. spread of innovations), it is common to characterize any adopter of a new technology, product, or service an innovator. This then leads to a distinction between diVerent types of innovators, depending on how quick they are in adopting the innovation, and a discussion of which factors might possibly explain such diVerences (Rogers 1995) . While this use of the terminology may be a useful one in the chosen context, it clearly diVers from the one adopted elsewhere. It might be preferable to use terms such as ''imitator'' or ''adopter'' for such cases. 4. Similarly for automobiles: while the idea of a power-driven vehicle had been around for a long time, and several early attempts to commercialize cars driven by steam, electricity, and other sources had been made, it was the incorporation of an internal combustion engine driven by low-cost, easily available petrol that made the product a real hit in the market (Mowery and Rosenberg 1998). 5. A somewhat similar distinction has been suggested by Henderson and Clark (1990) . They distinguish between the components (or modules) of a product or service and the way these components are combined, e.g. the product ''design'' or ''architecture.'' A change only in the former is dubbed ''modular innovation,'' change only in the latter ''architectural innovation.'' They argue that these two types of innovation rely on diVerent types of knowledge (and, hence, create different challenges for the Wrm).
20. Available econometric evidence suggests that innovation, measured in various ways (see Smith in this volume), matters in many industries, not only those which could be classiWed as being in the early stage of the product-cycle (Soete 1987; Fagerberg 1995) . 21. For an overview, see Aghion and Howitt (1998) . See also the discussion in Fagerberg (2002 Fagerberg ( , 2003 , and Ch. 18 by Verspagen in this volume. 22. For a discussion of the role of diVerent types of knowledge in economics, including the organizational dimension, see Cowan et al. (2000) and Ancori et al. (2000) .
